Abstract
valued considering those hypothetical decision situations (Choice-Dile=a problems) (Kogan and Wallach, 1964) on which risky shift occurs. And each of these indicators of a risk value is at the basis of a corresponding explanation of the risky shift, each of them constituting a version of 'value theory'. 1. Madaras and Bem (1968) have shown that risk-accepting stimulus persons are more positively evaluated than cautious stimulus persons. Similarly, Jellison and Riskind (1970) have shown that higher risk levels chosen by (or ascribed to) a stimulus person are associated with higher abilities being attributed to him by subjects. According to the explanation of the risky shift proposed by the latter authors, the group situation increases the typical participant's motivation to appear as a person of high ability, leading him to come out for riskier decisions at the end of the discussion. No empirical evidence exists as yet on this version of value theory, that is, on an association between value (thus operationalized) and risky shift. 2. Levinger and Schneider (1969) and Lamm, Schaude, and Tro=sdorf (1971) have shown that college students place the ideal (most admired and respected) decisions at higher risk levels than their actual decisions, a fact which these authors consider as an indication of an 'unfulfilled' value of risk. The corresponding explanation of the risky shift proposes that there is something about the group interaction (discussion) that allows the typical parti cipant to move toward the (riskier) decisions he considers ideal. Lamm, Schaude and Trommsdorff (1971) have shown that risky shift is indeed an empirical function of the extent to which group members value risk acceptance (as defined above). 3. Substantiating an earlier claim by Hinds (1962) (see i3rown, 1965) , Wallach and Wing (1968) and others have shown that college students typically think that their peers are less willing to accept risk than they are themselves, from which these authors infer that 'risk is a value ' (Wallach and Wing, 1968) . Tb,' Lorresponding explanation of risky shift is as follows. During the group interaction (discussion), the typical participant discovers that the others are just as risk-accepting as he himself; in order to keep up his image as a risk-taker, he shifts toward riskier decisions. Clark, Crockett, and Archer (1971) found more risky shift with groups of subjects strongly underestimating their peers' risk acceptance (as described above), as compared to groups of overestimating subjects. Th,; :~; csent study is intendc:d to investigate critically the nai1:rc ()f the last type of value Jl1dex (underestimation of peers' risk acceptance) and its role in the risky shift.
Why should subjects typically consider themselves as ;'"celling their peers in lisk acceptance? a) One possible reason is that this allows them to see (and/or portray) themselves (to the researcher) as sUDerior. But note that this already assumes that these subj;:cts regard the willingness to take risks as a valuable characteristic to have (and/or display) . The truth of that assumption would still have to be tested, independently. Secondly, it assumes a fair level of self-esteem, and/or a desire to be esteemed (by the researcher who gets to see the subject's answers). b) Another possible reason is that subjects, while themselves considering high risk acceptance as ideal, believe that their peers' ideals are at comparatively lower risk levels, hence ascribing less risky actual decisions to their peers. c) Another conceivable reason for the relatively risky self-image of the typical subject is that he may feel that he would be unusually able, try unusually hard, and/or be unusually lucky, meaning that he would be more favored than his peers with a positive (successful) outcome. However, this possibility is hard to investigate 'with, and indeed not applicable to, the hypothetical decision-making situations (Kr,gan and Wallach's Choice Dilemmas) used in all relevant studies mentioned above (including the present study). But they could be fruitfully investigated using decision tasks with actual outcomes and clearly separable skill and chance components.
Value indicator or not, the fact that subjects typically think of themselves as more risk-prone than their peers may underlie, or contribute to, the risky shift. The findings of Clark, Crockett and Archer (1971) already mentioned seem t·) point to such a conclusion. However, as these authors note themselves, along with the variation of their independent variable went a variation in another variable: the underestimator groups, compared with the overestimators, were higher risk-takers. Thus, the higher risky shift of the underestimators could be due to their higher initial risk levels. That interpretation is quite plausible, considering that Lamm, Schaude, and Trommsdorff (1971) found subjects' actual and ideal initial positions to be positively correlated, and also found that groups with riskier ideal decisions (but equal actual decisions) showed more risky shift than groups with more cautious ideals. The present study, in which, too, one independent variable is the extent (or presence/absence) of underestimation, will use an analysis of covariance to extract the possible confounding effects of actual and of ideal initial decisions.
Another purpose of the present study is to explore the motivational basis of the risky shift. Each of the explanatory formulations (versions of value theory) noted above involves the' (unfulfilled) desire to excel, that is, to affirm risk levels 1hat 1. indicate high ability, 2. are considered ideal by oneself, or 3. surpass those of one's peers. The group discussion presumably provides the occasion to revise one's earlier decisions so as to move toward, or maintain, one's standard of ·"xcellence. The question of interest here is whether the psycholugical reward (so11;l1t) for the manifestation of superior behavior is approval by oneself or approval by others.! In other words, does risky shift primarily serve the need for self-esteem or the need of social esteem.
Our own previous research (Lamm, Schaude and Trommsdorff, 1971 ) has yielded some rather inconclusive findings on that question. Dyads composed of subjects high, as compared with those low, in 'need for social approval' (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964) did not differ with regard to risky shift. But this may have been due to the small group size: one other participant (the case of the dyad) presents less incentive than (say) three others (the case of the four-man group) for displaying a socially approved image. Also, the Crowne-Marlowe questionnaire contains a dimension of seZt-as well as social approval (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964, p. 201) . More informative was a near significant correlation (p < .10) between the dyadic subjects' joint self-esteem scores (Cohen, 1953) and their risky shift. As the self-esteem questionnaire was administered after the discussions, the direction of causality was left open.
To investigate the possible role of self-esteem, a test-retest design will be used in which the subjects indicate their self-esteem before and after group discussion. Any enhancement in self-esteem following group discussion, or a correlation between initial self-esteem and risky shift or between risky shift and self-esteem enhancement, will provide pertinent clarifications.
To investigate the possib;(' role of social esteem (respect from others), the present experiment involves one condition in which the decisions at the end of the group discussion (without a consensus requirement) are stated publicly and another one in which the) are noted down, privately by the participants. If the desi 1 e for social esteem is involved, more risky shift may be expected in the public condition, since it provides more of a basis for the (actual or imagined) approval presumably forthcoming from the others (participants and/or experimenter) for respectably risky decisions.
In sum, the present study is intended to provide evidence on a) the psychological basis, and contribution to risky shift, of subjects' tendency to view their peers as less risky than themseJ\ GS, and b) the roles played by self-and by social esteem ml)tivation in the risky ~~lift.
1. Of course, performing at iJigh st;rndards of excellence can be its own reward, arising from something like the ,,,chievement motive (see Heckhausen, 191,  But it appears imrl,\;sible to make SUe an assumption here, given the present concern with hypothetical decision situations (the ChoiceDilemmas used in the research here di,-cussed) where no actllal performance t"k,·s place.
Method

Subjects
One hundred and forty-six female German high-school students (ages 15-20) volunteered to participate in return for a honorary of 10 Deutsche Mark. On the basis of initial measures and availability, 114 of the 146 participants in the initial session were selected for the experiment proper.
Risk-taking instrument
The Choice-Dilemmas task (Kogan and Wallach, 1964 , App. E) was used. to measure risk taking. Items 6 and 12 were omitted, and the remaining items were translated and adapted to fit the German cultural context (see Lamm and Kogan, 1970) . Each item presents a hypothetical decision situation as might occur in every-day life, in which a protagonist has to choose between a relatively unattractive but safe course of action and a more attractive but risky alternative (for example, carrying on with a heart ailment versus undergoing an operation). The level of risk-taking is indicated by the minimum odds of success considered necessary for choosing the risky alternative. The la-point risk-taking scale ranges from ala % to a 100 % chance that the risky alre:native would be successfuL
Initial (pre-treatment) session
Between 10 and 30 subjects took part in any particular initial session; all assignments were to be carried out individually.
Choice-Dilemma measures
In the first part of the session, Ss went through the ten-item Choice-Dilemma instrument four times. a) For each item, they indicated the minimum odds they considered necessary before rec~om mending the choice of the risky alternative. b) They were then asked to go through the Choice-Dilemmas again and indicate, for c::ach item, the response they thought would be given by the majority of Gl· man students of their own sex. 1:' • . ~ ther" words, they no I c'd down the minimum odds of success presumably chosen by most of their peers. c) Then they were asked to go thrnugh the items another time and indicate the decisions for ~hich they had the llighest regard (' ... Ihre hochste Anerkennung finden wiircJe ').
d) As a final assignment, they indicated the decisions for which they thought their peers had the highest regard.
Polarity ratings
In the second part of the initial session, the subjects were asked to rate themselves on thirteen seven-point semantic-differential scales representing the dimensions of evaluation, activity, and potency (Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1957) . The instrument was used in the (translated) version developed by Pervin and Lilly (1967) for their study of self-esteem. Instructions stressed that subjects should indicate their present impressions, and were not expected to note down judgements of lasting truth . .. J'he subjects .were asked to indicate a) how they saw themselves, b) how they thought they were seen by their peers, c) how they wanted to be (their ideal self), and d) how they wanted to be seen by their peers. The thirteen polar adjective pairs were as follows : sociable-unsociable, good-bad, passive-active, eager-indifferent, strong-weak, constrained-free, cruel-kind, selfish-unselfish, slow-quick, excitable-calm, severe-lenient, soft-hard, wise-foolish. (The good, active, or potent pole of each dimension is given in italics.) Subjects completed all thirteen ratings on question a), then on b), etc.
F:xperimental (treatment) session Group condition (24 four-person groups)
The group discussion took place a few, weeks iifter the initial session. Upon arrival at the laboratory, each subject received an instruction sheet and a booklet containing the Choice-Dilemma descriptions.
The four participants were instructed to discuss each of the problems and, at the end of a discussion, indicate their decisions (minimum odds of success considered necessary for choosing the risky alternative). For the latter, they could draw on the considerations brought out during the discussion. It was pointed out that while each member should make her own decision, the exchange of views could, of course, lead to a consensus; the latter was, however, not required.
The group was asked to discuss each item thoroughly before making their decisions but to take DO more than five minutes for each item. The decisions were to be Doted down by each subject herself (private condition); or to be announced aloud for the experimenter to note them down, in rotating order over the ten items (public condition).
After all Choice-Dilemma items had been discussed, the subjects were asked to do the polarity ratings again (see 'initial session').
Control condition (18 Ss)
This WaS essentially a retest -without intervening group discussion -taking place a few '.\'eeks after the initial session. The subjects, several at a time, indicated their own decisions on the Choice Dilemmas and made the polarity ratings described above.
Independent variables and design
Factor A: Underestimation of peer's risk acceptance This va:iable concerned whether the subjects showed little of the typical underestimation of peers' risk acceptance or slight overestimation, or whether they showed it toa marked degree. Underestimation was measured by the·difference between a subject's estimate of her peers' decisions and her own decisions on the ChoiceDilemmas (that is, measure b) minus measure a), as described above). On the basis of this index, the 146 subjects of the initial sample were classified, by median split, as low or high in underestimation.
As underestimation correlated negatively with the value placed on riskiness (measure a) minus c) as described above) (r = -.22, df = 144, p < .05), and since -as shown previously (Lamm, Schaude and Trommsdorff, 1971 ) -higher value results in more risky shift, value had to be kept constant over the two underestimation conditions. Aside from this selection criterion, subjects were assigned at random to the two conditions. However, it proved impossible to equalize them also with regard to subjects' own initial decisions. Hence, the control of the latter variable had to be left to covariance analysis.
Factor B: Statement of final decisions
The second independent variable concerned whether the group members put down their final decisions (after group discussion) privately or announced them publicly. Groups were assigned at random to these two conditions. The design for the group sample thus was a 2 X 2 factorial with 6 groups in each cell, From the remainder of the initial sample (after assignment to experimental conditions) subjects were assigned to the control condition (N = ,18) at random and on the basis of their availability at the scheduled time. The control sample could not be iT'c111ded into an overall design because it was too small and because, for practic)] fl':lsons, it proved impossible to introduce the experimental manipulations here. The main reason forinc1uding a control sample was to check for any retest effects on the Choice-Dilemma decisions and on the polarity fatings. Table 1 shows the means for the Choice-Dilemma responses and polarity ratings. Considering the initial sample of 146 subjects, there is a significant underestimation of peers' risk acceptance (p < .001), and there is a significant risk value (ideal decisions are at higher risk levels than actual decisions) (p < .001). The findings froill our earlier study (Lamm, Schaude and Trommsdorff, 1971 ) based on female university students, are thus replicated with female high-school students. In addition, as the table shows, subjects attribute a risk value (discrepancy) of equal magnitude as their own to their peers (p < .001). In this sense one is justified in speaking of a .YI'c·ial value. However, it may further be noted that subjects place their peers' ideals at significantly lower risk levels than their own ideals on the Choice-Dilemma scale (p < .05).
Results
Measures obtained from the initial sample
The pattc;'u of correlations among the various m,:asures mentioned;;bove paral-leled the findings of La=, Schaude and Trommsdorff (1971) and therefore will not be described further.
Statistics on the polc.rity ratings obtained from the initial sample are not prc:-sented in this report, since they are of no relevance to the present purposes. None of the correlation coefficients among Choice-Dilemma and polarity-rating measures were significant. Table 2 presents the shifts in risk taking for the various conditions. In the 2..J. experimental groups, there was a significant shift . .toward higher risk levds Ct = 6.20, dj = 23, p < .001), whereas Ss in the control condition did not shift s~gnif
Shifts (changes from first to second measure)
Choice-Dilemma decisions
icantly. An analysis of variance yielded no significant effects of either independent variable;2 nor did analysis of covariance using own initial decisions, ideal decisions, and peers' ideal decisions as covariates. Table 3 presents an analysis of cases in which relatively 'pure' conditions of overestimation and of underestimating of peers' risk acceptance were given. Among the 240 discussion cases (24 groups, each discussing 10 items) we picked out those in which no member had underestimated his peers' risk acceptance (in other words, cases in which every group member had thought his peers' decisions were more risky, or equal, relative to "his own decisions); there were 30 such cases of (what we will call) overestimation (or low underestimation). In addition, we picked out those cases which no member had overestimated his peers' risk acceptance (in other words, cases in which every group member had thought his peers' decisions were less risky, or equa1~ relative to his own decisions); there Were 26 such cases of (high) underestimation. (It should be noted that, unavoidably, the various items and groups are represented with different frequencies in this post-hoc collection of 'pure' cases.)3 There was no difference in mean amount of risky shift among these two conditions. The same negative result was found when the underestimation cases were selected in such a way as to keep initial risk level constant over the two conditions (but -unavoidably -relaxing the criterion of underestimation so that one or more group members could be an overestimator in a particular case).
2. The F values for the effects of underestimation and decision statement and their interaction were .11, 1.37, and AS, respectively.
3. The same type of procedure has been used by Vinokur (1970) in his post-hoc analysis of the effect of initial position distribution on risky shift. No significant changes were found from the first to the second measure on the pol:lrity ratings. The picture was the same for the control and the four experimental conditions, showing no effect of group discussion or of the independent valiables.
Correlations with risky shift
Correlations among the Choice-Dilemma measures and risky shift displayed the S:l::'e pattern as in Lamm, Schaude and Trommsdorff (19711 and will not be taken up ;lere.
The second (post-discussion) polarity ratings (summed over the thirteen scales) of actual self, peers' image of self, ideal self, and peers' ideal image were significantly or near-significantly cor:-c:iated with risky shift across all 24 gwups er = -.46, -.36, -.44, and -.43, respectively -coefficients above .40 being significant at the .05 level, with 22 df).4 In other words, greater risky shift went along with higher self-regard. The polarity measures mentioned above correlated positively among each other. It is emphasized that all these correlations involved group scores. For individual scores, the above correlations were in the same direction but not significant.
Discussion
Interpreting the underestimation of peers' risk acceptance
As our data show, the discrepa!lcy -in the subjects' eyes -between their peers' actual and ideal decisions is no larger than between their own actual and ideal decisions. Hence, the underestimation of peers' risk acceptance cannot be due to the fact that subjects believe their peers to live less up to their risky ideals than themselves. (However, the reverse direction of causality may also be true. This question can be answered only by appropriate variations in the sequence of various judgments made by the subjects.) It may also be noted that subjects' own actual decisions are significantly less risky than their peers' ideal decisions. In other words, they acknowledge that their own actual decisions are at levels of risk below wh"t their peers would considerm"Ost admirable.
The role of underestimation in risky shift
The evidence from the study of Clark, Crockett and Archer (1971) -that (greater) underestimation of peers' acceptance causes (greater) risky shift -could not be reproduced here. No differences in risky shift were found between groups with (slight) overestimation and groups with (considerable) underestimation of peers' risk acceptance, even after differences in initial own risk decisions were controlled by analysis of covariance.
It must be acknowledged that Clark et al.'s (1971) procedure for testing the effect of estimation of peers' decisions was more sensitive, by their criterion for manipulating that variable. Their four overestimation ('cautious') groups were defined as groups whose members believed their peers to be more risky than them-4. Considering the three subsets (evaluation, activity, potency) separately, significant correlations with risky shift were found only for the activity subset in the case of ratings of actual self (r = -.54) and for the potency subset in the case of ratings of peers' ideal image (r = -.48).
selves on at least four of the six items used; their six underestimation ('risky') groups consisted of subjects who believed, on at least four items, that their peers were less risky, or (at most) as risky, relative to themselves. In other words, overestimation (or, respectively, underestimation) was present in (at least) 67 percent of the items. We computed the same index and found overestimation to be present in only 43 percent of the cases in our low-underestimation condition, whereas underestimation (as defined above) was present in 84 percent of the cases in the high-underestimation condition. Thus there is reason to assume that our low condition was not as 'pure' as that of Clark et al. (1971) .
In view of the above, we selected, post hoc, relatively 'puree' cases of overestimation and underestimation (Table 3 ). No differences in risky shift were found when cases were selected so that initial decisions were equal over the two conditions but where, unavoidably, the underestimation cases were somewhat less pure, allowing the presence of one or more overestimators per case in that condition ('underestimation 2'). When underestimation cases were selected with priority for 'pureness' -but with higher initial risk levels, compared with the overestimation cases -risky shift was, again, not different in the two conditions. Thus, the findings of Clark, Crockett and Archer (1971) were in no way replicated.
The puzzling problem remains to explain the results of Clark, Crockett and Archer (1971) , who did find the estimation factor to have an effect. Consider the followi1lg interpretation. For their overestimation condition ('cautious' subjects) CIark et ill. (1971) assembled groups of fairly cautiousiniti-al risk levels, averaging 7.17 per item, whereas our subjects in this condition averaged only 6.06 per item (".43 and 5.07 are the respective values in the (high) underestimation condition in the two studies). Now, the average sizes of risky shifts in the low (or overestimation) and high (underestimation) conditions are 1.07 and .95 in our study and .23 and .99 in theirs, suggesting that it is the absence of risky shift in Clark et al.'s (1971) overestimation condition that needs to be explained. We suggest that in thes'~ groups the leaning toward caution was sufficiently strong to induce further movement toward the cautious pole, by the kind of extremization (or 'polarization') reported in recent studies (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1970; Doise, , 1970 Fraser, Gouge and Billing, 1971) . The forces normally leading to risky shift were thus offset by forces leading in the opposite (cautious) direction, the net result being no shift at all.
The contribution of the present findings will be further clarified by reference to the ,t,,(\v of Lamm, Schaude and Trommsdorff (1971) . The latter compared low with higll-value dyads ('value' being defined as the distancee of subjects' actual decisions from their more risky ideal decisions). The same group-compositional :" ocedure was used as in the present study. Now, the manipulated differences between the two value conditions of the earlier study was 14.11, that is, even somewhat smaller than the manipulated difference -20.09 -between the 1\\0 underestimation conditions of the present study. Yet, whereas the former study yielded a significant risky-shift difference between its two conditions, the present study yielded no difference whatever. The conclusion is that -by our procedurevalue (as we operationalize it) contributes more to n",,-y shift than does the underestimation factor. This is a conservative statement. We do not consider it warranted by our findings to conclude that the role of underestimation in risky shift is negligible; our kind of manipulation may have been inadequate. On the other h~md, it can be concluded fro mour data that, for risky shift to occur, it is not necessary that the majority of group members initially believe their peers to be less risky than themselves.
Implications of other results
Our data indicate that risky shift is not affected by whether the final decisions are stated publicly or left undisclosed. It must be noted, however, that our private! public manipulation cannot be considered a very strong one, since subjects presumably disclose their positions to a large extent during the discussion in either condition.
The fact that in the high underestimation groups risky shift was twice as large in the public than in.the priv,iteconditioii-(12. 71 versus 6.38) can at best be considered suggestive, since it is not a significant difference (t = 1.19, df = 10). The size of the difference, and the fact that it occurred among high underestimators -who are presumably more sensitive to the disclosure of positions -does lend some interest to it.
Overall, self-ratings did not become more positive, active, or potent, following group discussion and risky shift. (Again, our measurement technique may have been insensitive.) On the other hand, considering group scores, we did find that subjects' risky shift correlated positively with the self-ratings they gave immediately after the discussion session. These correlations -which were not due to any correlations between initial Choice-Dilemma measures and polarity ratings -indicate that, the more a group of subjects had moved toward higher risk, the higher they rated themselves on evaluation, activity, and potency.5 This motivational accompaniment of risky shift is plausible if one considers that through risky shift 5. We think it is justified in this discussion to focus exclusi, ely on the first set of 13 ratings -concnning how subjects see their actual self -and ignore the 1hree subsequent ones (ideal self etc.), w11ich were obviously nor independent of th" first.
individuals move closer toward realizing ideal, active, and potent levels of conduct. That high risk levels are regarded as implying greater activity and potency (in addition to value) has been shown by Madaras and Bern (1968) and by Jellison and Riskind (1970) in studies limited to perceptual and rating measures at the individual level, withoUT group interaction. The present study is the first to demonstrate an empirical link between subjects' shift to higher risk levels and their impressions of themselves on the dimensions of evaluation, activity, and potency. It may be recalled that in a previous study the present authors found a correlation between risky shift and self esteem (discrepancy between image of actual and of ideal self) as measured after the group discussions (Lamm, Schaude and Trommsdorff, 1971) . That earlier result can now be considered as having been substantiated by the evidence from the present study. The two findings -and the differences between them (a discrepancy measure in the earlier study, a simple image measure in the present one) -point to the need for more direct investigation of the relationship between changes in risk taking and self-image/esteem.
Gt'neral implications
What are the implications of our findings for a general unified explanation of risky shift in Choice-Dilemma decision situations? The main conclusion suggested by the data described above is that the underestimation of peers' risk acceptance plays no role in risky shift. The acceptability of that conclusion depends on whether there is a plausible theory which can do without the proposition that underestimation causes, or contributes to, risky shift.
Instead of recapitulation of available risky-shift theories ~md their various versions (see Pruitt, 1971 , for the most recent review and pertinent references), we will outline what we consider -on the basis of the existing research (including the present findings) as well as speculation -as the most plausible explanation of the phenomenon.
The fact that subjects place the ideal ('most admirable') decisions at higher risk levels, relative to their own actual decisions, indicates that they would readily commit themselves to Jligher risk levels if they had sufficient inducement and justification for doing so. Now, the inducement provided by the group (discussion) situation may be of two kinds.
First, the presence of others (group members anLi experimenter) offers greater incentive, relative to the rrior ,;olitary situation, for embracing (more) admirable positions. In other words, the need for respect from others as well as for selfrespect becomes more sirongly activated when others are present. But a subject must have some 'objectlve' justification (almost in the sense pf a pretext) -the)'" must be some intervening occasion -for discarding his prior position. Such a justification is offeree: by the fact of group discussion. This explanation, then, would hold even if th" discussion simply reflected the distribution of group members' prior positions, in so far as the mere occurrence of group discussion makes it appear admissible (in terms of the implicit rules of an experiment) fo:' n~e subjects to change their prior positions.
However, there is reason to assume that the discussion content itself -independent of the initial distribution of positions -is biased in favor of higher risk taking (relative to the average prior position), constituting a second inducement: We propose that the ~ypical participant in the discussion selects for his (initial) arguments those that speak in favor of his aspired position (that is, to pursue the desired goal even at a lower chance of success than he originally considered as barely tolerable). He does so in order to 'test' whether -by the soci:)l reality constituted by the group -the more aspired, risky position might be considered acceptable. Thus, the ensemble of discussion arguments come to be more in favor of risk acceptance than the arguments originally considered by each participant. As an ancillary inducement, going also in the direction of higher risk, the typical subject may have a tendency to be consistent with himself over a series of discussion contributions, constituting a sort of 'lock-in' for the higher risk bias of a,guments described above.
We suspect that both of the social inducements described above are operative in the typical risky-shift situation. Deternlining their relative'weights would be a matter of empirical research.
But what about those (few) Choice-Dilemma items on which no risky shift, or even cautious shift, has been reported to occur (~abow, Fowler, Bradford, Hofeller and Shibuya, 1966; Stoner, 1968; Vidmar and Burdeney, 1969; Fraser, Gouge and Billig, 1971 )? Our assumption is that on such items subjects consider the most admirable decisions to be no higher, or even lower, in risk level than their own actual decisions. Thus, no motivational pull comes from higher risk levels, or it may even come from lower risk levels.
The primary question then becomes, on what does it depend whether (in the subjects' eyes) the ideal ('most admirable') decision is more risky, equal, or less risky, relative to their own actual decisions. We submit that higher risk levels are considered ideal only if the goal is worth pursuing, that is, if the attractiveness of the positive outcome (the case of success) of the risky course of action outweighs the aversiveness of its negative outcome (the case of failure) and also exceeds the outcome value of the safe course of action. In other words, whether' higher risk acceptance is 'valued' -whether it has a motivational pull -depends on the relative size and configuraLlil of the utilitic-; of the possible outcomes involved. Thus, according to this view, parameters invoked in behavioral decision theory (see Becker and McClintock, 1967) enter as important determinants of choice shift, which is supported by recent evidence from Bumstein et al. (1971) and Vinokur (1971) .
nel et informationnel apportees par la discussion du groupe au moyen desquelles les membres du groupe en sont venus it ecarter leurs positions precedentes en faveur d'autres plus ambitieuses.
Pe310Me
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